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D

those who are disabled to be
fuller members of society, or does it ultimately seek to
eradicate disability and so promote a kind of eugenics
against those who are disabled? In the late 1990s and early
2000s, literature and debate on this question ran rampant. A common
example is that of cochlear implants, which endured much debate at
the time within the Deaf community regarding whether they eradicate
an impairment— or whether implants actually do away with entire
communities of the Deaf and thus displace an important minority culture.1 Yet, very little is written today on this question. Is it because the
question is settled, or because we have become satisfied with the presumed answers? (Answers which, repeatedly, tend to be: decisions regarding cochlear implants should be left up to patients, focused on
their autonomy, and almost entirely avoiding the more troublesome
question of whether a culture is being eradicated.2)
Similarly, in online contexts in the early 2000s, people extolled the
internet as a place where those with disabilities would finally find
themselves in equal position, authority, and accessibility related to
those without disabilities. Relatively early in the development of the
internet, scholars regarded digital technologies as ultimately promising and good for people of all disabilities, because of their nature as
mitigating disabilities. For example, the internet is often credited with
enabling access to texts for those who are visually impaired. Almost
since the beginnings of web development, there has been impetus to
make the web accessible to all, where “people can collaborate without
OES TECHNOLOGY ENABLE

1

See, for example, Robert Sparrow, “Defending Deaf Culture: The Case of Cochlear
Implants,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2005): 135-52.
2 See John B. Christiansen and Irene W. Leigh, “Children with Cochlear Implants:
Changing Parent and Deaf Community Perspectives,” Archives of Otolaryngology—
Head and Neck Surgery 130, no. 5 (May 2004): 673-7; Neil Levy, “Reconsidering
Cochlear Implants: The Lessons of Martha’s Vineyard,” Bioethics 16, no. 2 (2002):
134-53.

Theology, Technology, and Disability

91

barriers.”3 The rise of social media has seemed to fit into that kind of
collaborative worldview. Yet today, very little is written on this point,
even and especially in an age of social media, which has largely been
presumed to be an equalizer. Those who do write about it are highly
suspicious of whether new social media forms have actually engendered the hoped-for social changes relating to disability. One set of
scholars observes that the most recent iterations of the internet, sometimes called “web 2.0,”4 have meant a rejection of web standards that
had been set for disability, through which disability is understood and
recognized as a serious need in technological development from the
very beginnings, rather than an add-on (and afterthought) for every
new program that gets developed for the non-disabled. In other words,
“web 2.0 has been developed in and by the same social world that
routinely disables people with disability.”5
Our narratives about disability and disease link to narratives about
contemporary technology uses, but to my knowledge, few scholars
have explored these connections. In this essay, I argue that predominant narratives about technology in combination with predominant descriptions about disability revolve around understanding technology
as an asocial tool, which narratively proclaims a kind of neutrality.
People using technologies, and the contexts of both the technological
users and their technologies, make little or no difference to ways technologies are described or used. My concern and further argument is
that this has the effect of making people themselves become defined
by tools to the point that some people begin to treat other people as
tools rather than as people to be loved.
My attempt at bringing together narratives about disability and
technologies warrants a brief discussion about the inherent ambiguities in describing both disability and technology, though I will also
articulate further ambiguities throughout this essay. Some disabilities
may seem clear and self-evident: perhaps the use of a wheelchair, or a
person who is unable to feed himself. Yet a person with a broken arm
might also be considered to have a disability, and so might a person
with a far less visible condition, like a congenital heart defect. There
is, too, as I shall discuss further below, the serious question of whether
the term “disability” ever really applies to an individual person, or
whether it is a social condition. Likewise, some technologies may
seem clear and self-evident: the internet, especially with its variety of
social media platforms, comes across in scholarship and literature as
3

Katie Ellis and Mike Kent, Disability and New Media (New York: Routledge, 2011),
2.
4 This term, often used in discussions of digital scholarship, refers primarily to a stage
in internet development where the focus is less on content and more on user-generated
and facilitated interaction, one example of which might be today’s social media platforms.
5 Ellis and Kent, Disability and New Media, 3.
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a clear form of technology. Yet what is less evident and obvious is
how distinctive the internet as technology is, with its vast array of mechanical, physical, chemical and even social systems that are required
to make it function. A pencil is a form of technology too, though with
less immediate evidence of the array of systems fostering its production and use, and if we think of it as technology at all, we think of it as
an older technology with little thought to the fact that it too inculcates
an array of mechanical, physical, chemical and even social systems.
My above discussion of these ambiguities obviously takes pains to
note, in a beginning kind of way, how both disabilities and technologies are implicated in human sociality. Yet, in this essay, I shall attempt to display at least two main ways that the sociality of both technologies and disabilities is lost or hidden in our descriptions of them.
The narratives I critique as too disconnected from our social world, I
name as “asocial” or, sometimes, “disassociated.” In particular, I
worry that we understand our technologies primarily as tools to be
used, picked up and put down at will, but with little sense of their sociality. One of our predominant narratives about technology is to describe it as an “asocial tool,” which impacts how we envision and describe disability. In a technology-as-asocial-tool mode, people may be
evaluated in terms of their usefulness for the overall culture, or worse
still, in terms of their technological know-how. The fusion of narratives about technologies and disabilities negatively impacts people
with disabilities, whose usefulness does not compute well in relation
to a culture that thrives on efficiency.6 I proceed in this essay by first
discussing some of the prominent views of ethicists who describe technologies in dissociative ways, and I articulate how these views relate
to two primary models of disability (a medical model and a social
model) that exist in our contemporary discourse. I focus especially on
their theological anthropologies and their implications for work in disability.
My concluding section provides some thoughts on what it might
mean for theologians and others to narrate technological tools as socially formative rather than as asocial or disinterested. In particular, I
turn to discussion of love as communication, technology as communication, and how we might then understand technology socially formative, especially in relation to the person of Jesus Christ. My primary
theological interlocutor for this conversation on love and communication is Herbert McCabe, because the ways his work draws together
these themes sheds important light on the present concerns about technology. I conclude with some thoughts on how a technological world
can, indeed, be a world that shows us how to love.

6

See Hans Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008).
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DISABILITIES AND DISASSOCIATING SOLUTIONS
It is important to begin by noting that when we are dealing with
disability and technology together, we are bringing together several
disciplines. Scholars often discuss disability in terms of bioethics
questions (e.g., cochlear implants) or in terms of socio-political questions (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act and the ways that act
is carried out). Technology, on the other hand, is often discussed in
relation to communications faculties as well as a growing field of sociology of technology. Part of the difficulty in thinking through technology and disability in relation to theological anthropology resides in
the fact that very distinctive views of technology and disability emerge
from those fields, though as I argue below, both often think in terms
of technology-as-disassociative-tool, with different facets of that idea
present. Yet because technology is not often identified as being the
crux of the question in bioethics, and because disability is often ignored in technology studies, these questions tend to go undiscovered
and unanswered. Part of what I will do in this section is attempt to
bring together views of disability with views of technology according
to, first, bioethics discussions, and second, according to sociological
and cultural discussions.
Technology as Tool, Disability as Medical Problem
Bioethicist Adam Briggle describes the current state of bioethics
as a “thin,” “formal rational,” and “instrumentalist” view of a variety
of bioethics questions, in which I would include considerations of people with disabilities, to the point that a person with a disability may be
overlooked or done an injustice if they do not quite fit the views of
personhood emphasized in contemporary discourse.7 That is, in contrast to former strands of bioethics conversations in which “[s]ubstantive rationality [that] asks whether the means are consistent with ultimate ends or values,” the contemporary debate suggests that “formal
rationality asks whether the means employed are being maximized to
achieve assumed ends,” particularly in service of “autonomy, beneficence, and justice.”8 Maximization of autonomy, beneficence and justice in turn emphasizes the “contractual nature of society” in which
people are “atomistic rights-bearers” who determine their own good
via their own will.9 Briggle’s articulation of contemporary bioethics
raises concerns for those with disabilities, especially in its insistence
on autonomy, beneficence and justice, exactly because autonomy for
a person with disabilities is likely to look very different, if not unautonomous, compared to a person who is not so disabled. One of the
7

Adam Briggle, A Rich Bioethics: Public Policy, Biotechnology, and the Kass Council (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 33-4.
8 Briggle, A Rich Bioethics, 33-4.
9 Briggle, A Rich Bioethics, 62.
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chief difficulties with this, as Adam Briggle notes, but also as scholars
who think about the nature of human choices discuss, human desires
and identities do not come before established human relationships or
socio-political, economic, legal and other kinds of systems in which
humans are engaged.10
Yet the predominant bioethics view of the person that Briggle identifies lends itself very well to visions of technology-as-asocial-tool. In
bioethics, especially, we presume that our tools can be picked up and
put down at will, especially at the patient’s will. The principles of autonomy and rationality act together in such a way to reinforce that the
chief person responsible for deciding whether a tool will be used is the
patient, or those acting on her behalf, and the chief person wielding
the tools is the doctor, or other medical personnel.
As diseases and disabilities are named and identified, so too the
fixes are named and identified, precisely in relation to the kinds of
technologies that can fix the problem. For example, problems associated with sudden-onset hearing loss include suggestions for how to
identify sudden-onset hearing loss as early as possible, followed by
specific descriptions of the range of devices that assist in fixing sudden-onset hearing loss.11 This is a common place understanding of this
type of hearing loss and its fix, so it comes as little or no surprise.
Indeed, readers may wonder why I lift up such an obvious example (as
opposed to, say, more hot button technologically-related questions
like contraception or embryonic stem cell research, which perhaps
more obviously raise technological questions).
It is important to see, however, the ways in which even so simple
a description of condition and its fix intertwines with one predominant
way of narrating disability. A medical model of disability emphasizes
“disability as primary a medical or biological condition…. It claims
that the disabled person’s functional ability deviates from that of the
normal human body.”12 Medical models of disability presume such a
thing as a “normal body” against which disability is measured. From
that vantage point, medicine identifies and uses a variety of tools to
correct deficiencies. A medical model of disability hence readily fits
with a narrative of technology as a tool, which has as its aim correcting
the modes of autonomy and rationality so that those with disabilities
can fully (as possible) participate in a society that thrives on autonomy

10

On the nature of choice, see, for example, Sheena Iyengar’s very interesting set of
studies on how people’s choices do not either enhance their autonomies or lead to
their betterment as people. The Art of Choosing (New York: Twelve, 2010).
11 See, for example, N. Foden, et al., Australian Family Physician 42, no. 9 (2013):
641-4.
12 Deborah Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities, Academy Series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009),
23.
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and rationality. At the same time, medical models of disability presume that identifying what counts as a disability is simple and obvious, and especially left to experts.
To see more especially how a tool-based view can operate, especially in relation to questions about medical diagnosis of disability,
contemporary ethicist Julian Savulescu has argued, provocatively, that
“we have a moral obligation or moral reason to enhance ourselves and
our children. Indeed, we have the same kind of obligation as we have
to treat and prevent disease.”13 Savulescu’s argument presupposes a
specific view of disease, which involves the use of technologies to
prevent disease. He takes this view further, however, to suggest that
we have an obligation to humanity in general to use enhancement technologies as a means of improving ourselves. The limit to such medical
fixes and enhancements resides solely in the individuals concerned.
Savulescu, who heavily makes use of a utilitarian framework, suggests
that while he thinks that “like deafness, intellectual disability [he gives
the example of Down’s Syndrome] is bad. But my value judgment
should not be imposed on couples who must bear and rear the child.
Nor should the value judgment of doctors, politicians, or the state be
imposed directly.”14 Savulescu’s view directly draws upon the horrors
of enforced perfection via eugenics programs and he therefore claims
that “[as] rational people, we should all form our own ideas about what
is the best life. But to know what is the good life and impose this on
others is at best overconfidence.”15 Broadly understood, then, technologies exist in this view as tools to be taken up and set down at will, at
the behest of people who individually and autonomously determine
whether a disease or disability exists, what that disease or disability is,
and how it ought to be fixed.
Yet Savulescu’s view does not deal with the much trickier questions related to the fact that no person, no one family, acts within a
bubble, and that his solution directed at autonomy still does not get
around the eugenics problem. That is to say, leaving the question up
to individuals or parents or other such tightly constructed tiny communities ignores the impact that these decisions make on others’ work
and responsibilities. In addition, as Jeffrey Bishop has shown in his
work on end-of-life care, the very posing of questions about of quality

13

Julian Savulescu, “Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement of Human
Beings,” in Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, ed. Bonnie Steinbock (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 516.
14 Julian Savulescu, “Deaf Lesbians, ‘Designer Disability,’ and the Future of Medicine,” British Medical Journal 325, no. 7367 (October 5, 2002): 771-773, at 772.
15 Savulescu, “Deaf Lesbians, ‘Designer Disability,’ and the Future of Medicine,”
773.
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of life shapes the kinds of options people believe they have, in particular with respect to how we view our technologies and machines.16
Another way to put this is to recognize that the very ways people presume narratives about Down’s Syndrome shapes the kinds of choices
parents believe they have regarding genetic testing, abortion and
bringing a child to full term.17
The more minor medical diagnoses I discuss above, with suddenonset hearing loss signifies the kind of narrative that Briggle describes
however: a shift in bioethical thought that focuses on ends in relation
to happiness as measured by autonomy and rationality, over against
that of a substantive rationality. The “big issues,” in other words, only
mirror how conversations typically function. Consider the burgeoning
issue of artificial contraception. A significant component of recent debates on artificial contraception use regards questions about whether
human fertility is, properly speaking, a disease and whether, therefore,
it needs to be fixed. When the Institute of Medicine released its recommendations for women’s health care coverage under the Affordable Care Act, its rationale for contraceptives included:
Unintended pregnancy is linked to a host of health problems. Women
with unintended pregnancies are more likely to receive delayed or no
prenatal care and to smoke, consume alcohol, be depressed, and experience domestic violence during pregnancy. Unintended pregnancy
also increases the risk of babies being born preterm or at a low birth
weight, both of which increase their chances of health and developmental problems. Family planning services are preventive services
that enable women and couples to avoid an unwanted pregnancy and
to space their pregnancies to promote optimal birth outcomes. Pregnancy spacing is a priority for women’s health because of the increased risk of adverse pregnancy outcomes for pregnancies that are
too closely spaced (within 18 months of a prior pregnancy).18

The IOM supported these concerns with a variety of studies demonstrating such adverse effects. Opponents of the contraceptives recommendation argued, in part, against the idea of contraception as fixing

16
See Jeffrey Bishop, The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the
Dying (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011).
17 For example, Savulescu’s knee-jerk reaction to Down’s Syndrome babies in his
“Deaf Lesbians” article is that Down’s Syndrome ought, to rational people, count as
a problem best to be done away with.
18 Linda Rosenstock, “Clinical Preventative Services for Women: Closing the Gaps,”
Testimony provided by the Institute of Medicine Committee on Preventative Services
for Women, www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-PreventiveServices-for-Women-Closing-the-Gaps/Written%20Testimony-House%20Judiciary%20Hearing.pdf. Accessed August 25, 2014.
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a medical condition, since on their view, fertility cannot be classified
as such.19
Disability in relation to digital media similarly looks like technology-as-disassociative-tool, oftentimes where technology appears as a
fix for predicaments individuals with disabilities experience. For example, “[d]igital technology allows the manipulation of information
in terms of appearance, text size, color, and mode of output including,
for example, text-to-sound or Braille. In theory, digital information
can be accessed by many users with different needs in different
ways.”20 As the authors go on to note, however, in practice, this does
not happen, precisely because technology is no longer satisfyingly described (if it ever quite was) as the tools that we use to assist in our
daily lives, among other things. That is, “the web becomes more complex and a more ubiquitous part of life” to the point that descriptions
of the web, or indeed of many other forms of technology, inadequately
use tool imagery. Such descriptions and uses of technology, broadly
speaking, inhibit our abilities to reflect on and imagine better possibilities and ways of understanding what it means to be a human that uses
technologies. 21
There are several difficulties with the kinds of descriptions I mention above about disability and technology. Some of these difficulties
relate to what I mentioned in the introduction. How does the theological concept of love relate, or not, to the descriptions and visions we
have of (disabled) humanity on one hand, and technology use on the
other? One point that has arisen again and again in discussions of medical models of disabilities and the technologies that fix them is a focus
on rationality and autonomy. This focus privileges only one of many
possible aspects of what it means to be human. It is not clear that rationality and autonomy, especially in the Western senses in which
these terms typically appear in discourse, are the best ways of thinking
about what it means to be a human person. Stanley Hauerwas notes in
a 1986 essay: “the very humanity that causes us to cry out against suffering, that motivates us to seek to eliminate retardation, is also the
source of our potentially greatest inhumanity.”22 The presence of technology does not abrogate what has always been a difficult negotiation:
19

For two very different discussions of this point, but both raising strong questions
about the idea of fertility as medical problem, see: Susan Windley-Daoust, Theology
of the Body, Extended: The Spiritual Signs of Birth, Impairment, and Dying (Hobe
Sound, FL: Lectio Publishing, 2014) and Jennifer Block, Pushed: The Painful Truth
about Childbirth and Modern Maternity Care (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press,
2007).
20 Ellis and Kent, Disability and New Media, 48.
21 Ellis and Kent, Disability and New Media, 48.
22 Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the
Mentally Handicapped, and the Church (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1986), 160.
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how to live with suffering— our own and others’ and what it means
to love in the midst of that suffering.
A further concern is the degree to which love and machines intermix. Theologian Deborah Creamer suggests that a medical model
tends to identify the human body as “a biological machine that functions to a greater or lesser extent.”23 The “machine” notion of the body
makes the body itself out to be a tool as well, a tool that— if it functions well— heightens a person’s ability to participate in society, especially a consumer society that takes a dim view to people who are
less than useful. If we Christians wish to speak of love of neighbor,
one of the questions we need to confront with asocial or dissociative
views of technologies is what it means to love a human being who is
acted upon largely as a bodily machine. As MIT professor Sherry
Turkle has discussed (convincingly on my view) in her book Alone
Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each
Other, in our technocratic age, we are developing an inverse ability to
relate to human beings and machines.24 While studies on human behavior and robotics suggest that we develop and demonstrate many
forms of sympathy for them, even after knowing the ins and outs of
how the robots are programmed to respond to us in certain ways, studies on human treatment of each other, especially when we lurk behind
our screens, suggests an increasing inability to respond with sympathy, empathy and compassion. These are changes that Turkle observes
with some concern, especially as she observes how we place robotic
and internet technologies as presumable appropriate substitutes for human interaction with the most vulnerable among us: the elderly, children, and those with disabilities. The ones who lose out the most from
our love affairs with technologies, suggests Turkle, are those whose
humanity is often described or viewed at the very marginal edges of
human existence. Technologies become asocial, disassociating us
from each other, in real and felt ways.
The key difficulty, I suggest, is in the ways this overarching asocial
view of technologies limits our abilities to see other possible actions
and ways of describing and living out human relationships. Such a
view limits our creative thought and action and hence limits our ability
to love and respond to love. As Herbert McCabe suggested in his book
Love, Law and Language: love is a “growing word”, a word that we
learn to use over a lifetime of experience and encountering exemplary
lovers. Yet as McCabe hastens to note in commenting on what it
means that love is a “growing word”, “this does not in the least imply
that it is a vague word, one that might mean almost anything. It is just
that a word like ‘love’ will always have uses that are not constricted
23

Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 24.
See Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and
Less from Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011).
24
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by such rules for its use as you have managed to formulate any particular time.”25 That is, the word “love” is so spacious and mysterious
that it needs great capacity for people learn how to use it, and live it,
well. Our technologies, being part of the fabric of our social lives as
they are, need to be narrated as capable of such spacious activity as
well.
An additional concern with asocial views of technology hinge on
how well we name and understand disease, disability and other commonly-thought medical conditions. Our ability, or lack thereof, in
identifying diseases and conditions constricts our actions just as do
our uses of technology in relation to fixing those conditions. That is,
what if the very ways we name diseases is wrong, and what if the very
technologies we use already inscribe certain, likely unhelpful, views
of disability?
Bioethicist Carl Elliot has written several books calling into question positions like Savulescu’s, and exposing the ways communities
shape (in sometimes very questionable ways) diagnoses and presumptions about what counts as a medical disease. One of his most often
cited examples is a chapter in which he discusses apotemnophiliacs,
that is, people who desire to have limbs chopped off.26 With all their
limbs intact, they feel incomplete as themselves. Elliot observes that
the number of people in any given human community who desire to
have limbs cut off is vanishingly small; the advantages apotemnophiliacs have in an internet age is precisely that a community composed
entirely of apotemnophiliacs is possible. Moreover, the existence of
groups that now advocate for apotemnophilia means that now there
are several people who might approach surgeons with the request to
chop off an otherwise healthy limb, and the names of surgeons who
acquiesce get traded within these communities.
Part of Elliot’s point is to note that what apotemnophiliacs desire—
to be more themselves— is the same kind of argument that others with
more identifiable “diseases” make in advocating for treatment: for example, anxiety disorders across the spectrum, or a desire for breast
enhancement surgery. Elliot seeks to blur lines between medical diagnosis and a person’s identity, especially in relation to how communities shape and form both diagnoses and identities, and even the very
notion that medical diagnosis is largely a cut-and-dried task that has
very few grey areas or wiggle room (despite the fact that many physicians are quick to say that diagnosis is far more an art than a craft). A
medical model of disability seeks the problem to be fixed, as compared
with all the “normal” people in the crowd, and then seeks the tool to

25

Herbert McCabe, Love, Law and Language (London: Continuum, 2003), 18.
See Carl Elliot, Better than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream
(New York: Norton, 2003), especially chapter nine.
26
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be used; it also depends on a universal norm against which disability
gets measured.
Elliot develops the technology point far less well but it is important
nonetheless. The question of communities and identities is surely part
of the whole question, but the specific ways that technology enables
creation of communities, indeed could even perhaps be considered the
community (in a certain way) of apotemnophiliacs, is indispensable.
Without the logic of technologies and their particular ways of fostering communication, there is no coming-into-being of apotemnophilia,
and no community of apotemnophiliacs or sympathizers that presume
its normalcy. Carl Elliot’s point in this chapter is not that he necessarily thinks apotemnophilia or other such diagnoses are good or
healthy or beneficial, but the interconnectedness between the diseases
and problems we humans identify in each other, and the many facets
of human life, including technologies, that form and shape our thinking about what counts as a problem as well as a solution to it.
Thus, focusing on a medical model enables almost complete focus
on each individual person and directs the “problem” of disability and
its technological fix toward the disabled person, rather than examining
the communities of which they are part, and the ways even our tools
act on us and shape us all. These concerns about medical models have
led, however, to a different vision of disability, one that at the outset
looks more promising in its understanding of both disability and technology.
Disability as Socially Embedded,
Technology as Formative of the Social
Elliot’s concerns about medical diagnosis, and the attendant critiques about technology use relates to what disability scholars increasingly name as the “social model” of disability. Social models of disability are often regarded in stark contrast to medical models, since social models tend to understand disability as a marker of societal prejudice and lack of accommodation to peoples’ various impairments. As
theologian Deborah Creamer notes, social models understand disability as “social constructed and results from society not being organized
according to the needs of disabled people. The ‘problem’ is no longer
identified as the physical, cognitive, or psychological characteristics
of the individual, but rather is identified as prejudicial, exclusive, and
oppressive attitudes and barriers.”27 Mitigating against socially constructed disability means becoming engaged in social activism against
unjust barriers and exclusion of the disabled. Creamer further notes
that examples of social models of disability include the passage of the

27

Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 25.
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Americans with Disabilities Act and a focus on giving all people
“equal opportunity and full participation.”28
On a social model of disability, scholars make distinctions between
impairment, which is the physical attribute a person has, over against
disability, which is the social construct. Impairment, on this view, is
analogous to whether a person is left-handed or right-handed, than it
is a question of how well a particular person matches up with the concept of “normal.” Left- and right-handedness provides a strong analogy here in the sense that many of the tools humans create have been
with the right-handed person in mind, such that left-handedness becomes a problem and a “disability” in the face of a majority culture
where door knobs and kitchen utensils (among many, many other
things) are decisively right-handed. The social construction model of
disability is the most-often used model in contemporary disability
scholarship, though some theologians have begun to explore still other
ways of articulating disability.29
Identifying that the problem is chiefly about society’s response (or
lack thereof) rather than with the person who has impairment affects
peoples’ engagement with and assumptions about technologies. Rather than thinking in terms of technologies as tools for individuals with
individual problems, technologies instead become communally focused, known as universal accessible design. One of the benefits of
thinking about technology in this way is that, while technologies developed particularly for disabilities end up seeming weak, technologies developed for broad use do not carry these negative connotations.
For example, an architectural design of a ramp can be accessible to
wheelchairs and walkers alike, seamlessly woven into building design
in such a way that there need be no sign indicating “Wheelchair
Ramp” any than there need be a sign indicating “Walker Stairs.” Other
examples include curb cuts that assist wheelchairs, but also strollers,
skateboards, and walkers, and family restrooms that are large and spacious, and can be used across gender, age and ability. One example in
current design is the SMS system, developed for those are hearing impaired and Deaf, but used by nearly everyone with a cell phone for
texting.
The internet has often been seen as a special site for universal accessible design. It lacks many of the physical barriers, particularly
with respect to building barriers, that may prevent those with disabilities from even entering through the doors to attend meetings, classes,

28

Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 26.
Deborah Creamer’s book, cited above, is a prime example of someone exploring
other ways of articulating disability, as is the work of John Swinton, Brian Brock, and
their collaborators, in Disability in the Christian Tradition: A Reader (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2013).
29
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movies and so forth. Additionally, internet avatars provide great flexibility in terms of peoples’ representations of themselves, so that females can present as males, those without legs can present as having
legs, and so forth. Such an experience of an avatar can be liberating
simply because the disabled aspects that often cause knee-jerk and
prejudiced reactions to persons with disabilities can disappear.
Just as claims that the web is gender or race neutral are specious,
so too arguments that the web is disability neutral are problematic.
Digital documents may claim to be accessible for those with visual
impairments, but the documents themselves do not interface well with
screen readers. Those with hearing impairments frequently encounter
barriers regarding sound and video, especially in relation to inaccurate
or non-visible captioning, but also whether those who speak sign language can use that language to sign in to various online platforms.
While the ability to surpass such barriers exists in many cases, the attention to details regarding technologies required to surpass those barriers is not present.
I suggest that part of the difficulty is that some of the prevailing
presumptions about digital technology and impairment presume asocial views of technologies, even as they explicitly advocate social
models of disability. Though there is a key and significant shift from
individual to society in narratives about disability, there is no similar
shift in narratives about technologies as embedded in social life as
well. Technologies are often understood, broadly, as tools for eliminating social discrimination, with no special attention to the nature of
the technological “tool” itself. Universal accessible design sounds so
terrific, that it is easy to make very generalized statements about its
benefits, especially online. Yet, as Katie Ellis and Mike Kent note,
universal designs end up not being as universal as sometimes hoped,
since some groups may be helped and others not.30 Universal ramps,
for example, could be exceedingly dangerous for walkers in inclement
weather, and websites that are made accessible for visual impairments
are not necessarily accessible for other kinds of impairments, or for
use by people with no impairment. The social media site Facebook has
become known as particularly inaccessible to those with disabilities,
in contrast to the now defunct MySpace. Much of the reason is in the
design of the sites themselves, and associated philosophies driving the
designs. MySpace, with its fewer guidelines and greater options for
individual collaboration with the program itself was recognized for its
greater accessibility.31
Shifting the focus from individual to society, then, does not necessarily mitigate against an asocial view of technologies, and less still
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toward reflecting on technologies themselves in use relating to disabilities. Indeed, the Facebook versus MySpace example indicates how
dissociative views of technology mitigate against accessibility. Facebook’s emphasis on controlling its medium and interface has become
the standard, perhaps most evidently relating to privacy controls,
though I suggest that Facebook’s control over all aspects of its design
and functionality affects questions about accessibility as well.
What is especially interesting in the case of Facebook’s privacy
concerns is that, while certain descriptions of Facebook involve insistence about the new world or new era that Facebook ushers in, most of
our conversations about Facebook do not reflect such change. A 2010
Time Magazine article notes: “Facebook has changed our social DNA,
making us more accustomed to openness. But the site is premised on
a contradiction: Facebook is rich in intimate opportunities — you can
celebrate your niece's first steps there and mourn the death of a close
friend — but the company is making money because you are, on some
level, broadcasting those moments online.”32 Yet while we speak
about Facebook doing something distinctive, changing our social
DNA, our speech about Facebook and its privacy controls remains at
the level of tool. How do we fix our concerns about Facebook privacy
controls? There is a list: turn off certain Facebook functions, avoid
posting baby pictures, go to these websites and click on these links.
Yet if it is true that Facebook really does change our very way of relating to each other and to it, it cannot be the case that a simple tool
view suffices as a fix.
I note here that Savulescu’s argument for enhancement technologies articulated above relates equally well in a social disability model.
For someone who thinks that society is to blame for holding back those
with impairments, technologies, broadly defined, provide ways forward toward incorporating bodies into a fully-functioning society precisely by enhancing their bodies. What now count as “normal” impediments to human imaginings also become enhanced through technology so that in effect, each body no longer needs to exist according to
“normal” versus “disabled” labels, but rather “enhanced” and “unenhanced.” Such views of both technology and disability hint at both an
idyllic present and future, one in which differences wrought by disability are made relative by the fact that all humans seek enhancements
of one kind or other. We are all imperfect bodies seeking perfection,
or as close as we can come, via technology use.
One of the primary difficulties in these descriptions of disability
and the attendant technological concerns is that we humans still want
to name ourselves as masters of our technologies, including and espe-

32 Dan Fletcher, “How Facebook is Redefining Privacy,” Time Magazine (May 20,
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cially masters of the social media websites we use, without quite realizing the ways that technology masters us, and particularly masters,
and even hides, those who are disabled when we presume too much
about our technological tools. If we really can master technologies,
then we really can use them as tools to pick up and put down at will,
to fix individual and social affects wrought by disabilities, and more
besides. If we cannot master technologies, then… what about disability and pain and suffering? In a world where not leaving people suffering is one of the highest goods we presume we can achieve, perhaps
even equivalent to loving that person, asocial descriptions of technology reinforces certain views about hope and love (or lack thereof).
It should be said, as well, that the presumption that technology
fixes things in a way that requires little or no imagination about technology’s or disability’s connections to our social world also tends to
neglect or silence the fact that for many people with impairments who
experience disabilities, technologies never thoroughly erase pain and
suffering or the sense that one is “not normal.” Indeed, to return to the
question of cochlear implants that I raised at the beginning, lay people
often presume that cochlear implants will operate somewhat akin to
glasses in the sense that they will restore hearing to something like
20/20 vision, which we accept as normal eyesight. Yet, in fact, cochlear implants do not achieve this feat; for the user hearing still often
sounds mechanical. Add to this the surrounding questions of Deaf culture and the degree to which cochlear implants raise questions about
eugenicizing whole communities, then obtaining a cochlear implant
can potentially increase suffering on two fronts. Hearing is both not
“normalized” and a person may experience doubts and concerns about
the degree to which one belongs to a community should an implant be
attempted.
Thinking technologically about human beings and enhancements
can mean that disability becomes simply one among many things to
be eradicated, such that disability as a specific part of some human
beings disappears. As well, a focus on enhancements can make it look
like everyone is disabled, in a sense, everyone in need of technological
enhancement, but with all the technological enhancements directed toward individuals rather than their social and cultural contexts.
Thus, while a social view is in some ways more positive with respect to people with disabilities, in the sense that the “blame” for disability is not placed solely on the disabled themselves, such a view
also puts certain constraints on our abilities to learn to love. Love is
not boundless in the sense that just any activity, any use of technology,
counts as love, even when directed at the social problems we identify.
Nor is any sense of having “fixed” a problem the likely boundary of
what it means to love. To the contrary, learning to love people in our
uses of technologies and even with a sense that it is the social that
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creates disability, removes none of the burden that a call to love places
on our interactions with individuals.
All that said, I think a social model of disability has good potential,
especially if we likewise can understand and articulate technologies in
relation to social formation. Perhaps one of the benefits of disabilities
is that they offer spaces where we can see some of our technologies’
workings and also failures. While I do think that we humans generally
take technologies both far too seriously than we ought (but in the
wrong ways), and far less seriously than we ought (but in the wrong
ways), I am not an advocate of technological rejection. Indeed, the
insistence of those who are disabled pressing constantly against the
inaccessibility that they encounter in a range of technologies affords
some hope for thinking through what it means to need technologies
but also how to grapple with the various problems technologies present, some of which I have represented above.
HOW DO WE LEARN TO LOVE IN A TECHNOLOGICAL ERA?
Thus far, I have broadly discussed what I see as two majority ways
technologies, especially in relation to disabilities, get discussed and
interpreted. Whether the focus is on the individual with a disability, or
on society that creates a disability where only impairment existed beforehand, I suggest that a nearly automatic response is to consider
what can fix the problem so described, and in primarily asocial ways.
In this final section, I briefly and very broadly discuss a potential theological way forward, one that perhaps permits us judiciously to use
some technologies as tools, but also helps us articulate a far more complex narrative that may not, on its own, solve questions about disability as such, but may at least allow us to think more proactively about
what it means to use our technologies in the service of love. My brief
exploration of themes about Christ, technology, communication and
love here will not be wholly satisfying; this work will need further
development. Yet as I suggested at the beginning of this essay, I do
not wish simply to describe the problems I see regarding technology
and disability without also suggesting possible different way forward.
A first step is to think about technology not merely as a tool, but as
constituting a social world, naming ways that we relate to other humans, even and especially when people do not quite realize or articulate that relationship, particularly when the sociality of technologies
has been disrupted. Brian Brock’s work on technology and theology
articulates such an assessment in his descriptions of historical developments of a range of technologies. He discusses how the development of the Psalter and practices of this “textually formed performance
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of collective worship” in which peoples’ very bodies and also relationships to other bodies are shaped and formed.33 By contrast, he finds
that the increasing use of books, as such, in the Scholastic period and
later, makes use of bookish technologies in such a way that the focus
becomes the individual reading that book, and memory becomes “a
carefully constructed archive of wisdom contained in the individual’s
mind.”34 Brock then carries his discussion to a consideration of present-day Christian worship online, where he suggests, “[when] the
consumption of people’s everyday lives has become entertainment,
and surveillance an everyday fact of life, a new humanity is born…
the public and publicity become all-encompassing.”35 How, then, does
this social world born of internet relationships impinge on Christian
life in particular? Brock suspects that the mode of constant self-publication in internet life turns us away from other, more gospel ways of
relating to people.
My main point in bringing up Brock here is to attempt to show, in
brief, how examinations of technologies require a view toward the social. A utilitarian technological focus on “fixes” tends to focus on one
individual, or individual part of social fabric, assuming that once
fixed, that individual can then more fully participate in social fabric—
whether that “fix” involves a person with hearing loss, a privacy control setting, or as in Brock’s examples, an individual church hoping to
fix declining membership simply by generating a web presence. Such
a view is asocial, not requiring attention to particularities.
For Christians, recognizing the kinds of social formation that technology engenders can have several possible responses, including the
well-known approach of Christian societies themselves rejecting various forms of technology. Many contemporary theologians writing
about technologies have been hesitant to make quite so drastic a move,
since in most cases rejection of certain technologies merely postpones
inevitable further conversations as technologies continue to develop.
In relation to particular questions about disability, moreover, rejection
of technologies in whole or in part stand, in whole or in part, to ignore
peoples’ pain and suffering and the effects of their impairments/ disabilities. That is, such a response to technology is as potentially eugenicizing as a medical model’s overemphasis of cochlear implants may
be.
Attempting to discuss technologies in terms of social formation is
difficult, however. Even in this essay where I am attempting to narrate
the ways we often describe technologies as asocial, and turn toward
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social narratives in contrast, I have at times failed. I suspect that creating the kind of community that pays attention to technology for its
sociability, or lack thereof, requires embodied practices that help
shape peoples’ responses to technology in ways different from our unreflective approaches.
My concern and proposed remedy takes a cue from problems in
Christology. Too often, the meaning of the incarnation is reduced to
asocial usefulness, too. Jesus’s life is reduced to a set of teachings, a
useful person on the sidelines who could be consulted for making difficult decisions, or again, a useful emblem to display at will. This
problem is a main concern of Wittgensteinian Thomist Herbert
McCabe, who articulates again and again how God Incarnate cannot
be so easily used and discharged, in ways similar to the technological
tools I have described above. In one of his later Christological essays
called “He Was Crucified, Suffered Death, and Was Buried,” McCabe
writes, “[Jesus’] alternative was not a philosophy or a theology or a
social theory or a political programme. It was simply himself. Believe
in me, he says.”36 McCabe continues by maintaining the crucial point
that what it means to believe in Jesus is to enter into a relationship
with Jesus, and the only way to do so is to make a response to Jesus
with one’s whole life.
Elsewhere, McCabe observes: “Jesus is not offering a blueprint for
a new kind of society, an ideal which men [sic] may or may not choose
to realize, he is offering himself as the centre of this new society.”37
McCabe strongly rejects motifs that describe Jesus primarily in terms
of useful tools that lead to a better society, as in the blueprint, but rather as the new society itself. What McCabe does here is place all focus, all emphasis, on the whole of who Jesus is, rather than making
any hint whatsoever that Jesus might be a step on the road toward the
solution or ideal we seek.
Technology is often defined in terms of mere usefulness because
sociality, too often, is defined in utilitarian terms (i.e., social contract
theory), where humans exist as apparent independent beings who
come together at stated times for stated purposes, and especially to
“fix” problems requiring, say, the use of an army, or taxation and so
forth.38 In the revelation to which McCabe refers, the incarnation constitutes a set of social relations, which are not a means to an end but a
sacrament— a making present— of the end of reconciliation and love.
Consider the praise Jesus gives to a woman who wastes an entire jar
of expensive perfume by breaking the jar and pouring the contents on
36

Herbert McCabe, God Still Matters (New York: Continuum, 2002), 98 (emphasis
original).
37 McCabe, God Still Matters, 130 (emphasis original).
38 This is certainly how I interpret Robert Nozick’s account of justice and society. See
Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

108

Jana M. Bennett

his feet. Both jar and perfume are ancient forms of technology that
have an obvious use. But that “use” is spoiled. The jar is broken.
Wasted in terms of use, the broken jar of perfume becomes a sign of
the woman’s self-giving love—which itself serves as a sign of God’s
self-giving love poured out, regardless of expense.
McCabe sees love embodied especially in the particular community of Christian church and its practices, and so do others whose work
borrows from his ideas.39 In these terms, technologies can be seen not
merely as useful, but as “making present” sociability— sociability that
conveys wholeness, reconciliation, and redemption in itself, in just the
way that Jesus cannot be a mere blueprint, but is himself what we seek.
In relation to disability and technology, then, what it means to think
of technology as sociable formation is for whole communities to put
on the technologies that are so often used as fixes for disabilities. For
Christians, this means particularly to think about, and allow formation
from, technologies in relation to making present reconciliation and
love, especially to those who suffer. At times, this kind of sociable
technological formation may look similar to a social model of disability because I think it requires us all to be formed by the technologies
that currently mostly disabled people use. The ramps mentioned above
that are for the use of all, not only those in wheelchairs, are a key example. What might it mean, too, to allow hearing and vision technologies to form and shape communities, architecture, structure and all?
This view also makes use of medical models of disability and technology, especially in helping articulate ways in which medical solutions
can be sociable.
Yet, as I described my concerns with these various models of disability in the previous section, I do not think this kind of communal
life focused on the ways technologies (including older forms of technologies that we no longer consider even as technologies) entirely enables this sacramental making present of reconciliation and love. Part
of the reason is that the social model of disability, as with technology
itself, often aims to fix something that cannot be fixed, and that is human suffering. An emphasis on technology and its sociality does not
hold with a sense of utopia, at least not when understood in Christological view. Technology does not eradicate suffering and death, not
even in the presumed halcyon fields of (relatively) disembodied life
online.
39
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Such a view of technology linked to suffering and death accords
with a new understanding of disability that has emerged as an alternative to the medical and social models. Deborah Creamer has advocated
for a theology of disability that focuses on and embraces limits. “The
limits model highlights the fact that human limits need not (and perhaps ought not) be seen as negative or as something that is not or that
cannot be done, and instead claims that limits are an important part of
being human—a fact that is overlooked when we reflect on the human
body as generic.”40 For Creamer, one of the advantages of her argument is that it enables some of the best parts of both the medical and
social models, but also allows for the fact that those models do not, in
fact, “cure” disability. A medical model of disability has an important
place, just as a social model does, with their attempts to enable those
with disabilities/impairments as full access to social participation as
possible. Still, both models leave a gap, which is that despite the diagnoses and the fixes, impairment and disability is still felt in various
ways. To talk of eradicating impairments or disabilities, as in the cochlear implant debate, is indeed to speak of eradicating people, even a
culture, because eradicating disability cannot be done via technology,
except insofar as those tools enable death.
By contrast, Creamer’s theology of embodiedness accepts that we
have limits, despite, and sometimes because of, our technologies. Acknowledging those limits in relation to disability and technology enables people state and reflect on those limits in particular ways. This
deep reflection on limits can and should be part of peoples’ lives, irrespective of disability and impairment. For example, instead of envisioning the internet as a broadly open and accepting space for those
with disabilities, a view to embodiedness acknowledges that humans
access the internet bodily and in only limited ways; there is no other
way to access it (not even Google Glass enables full disembodiment).
The more we recognize our own limits when we use our technologies,
the more able we are to understand others’ limits in relation to technology and see that our technologies, however good, are not absolute
fixes.
Thus, our best attempts to be formed by sociable technologies also
requires us to walk with (and hear with, and see with, and think with,
and so forth) people in the full ranges of their impairments, suffering,
and disabilities. It means acknowledging the limits of both bodies and
technologies, seeking ways, instead, to articulate clearly the times
when technologies fail to form us well. Jesus’ own life, suffering, and
death offer a strong strand of Christian tradition in this regard, one that
Christians have articulated and embodied in numerous ways, including the sacrament of the sick, the sacrament of reconciliation, healing
40
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services, foot washing, the Eucharist, peace and reconciliation commissions, prayers and meditations on Jesus’ suffering, and so forth.
These, too, need reflectively to be a strong part of any Christian community’s desire to be responsive in a technological and able-bodied
way. The most technologically-savvy and apparently welcoming
church misses the point if pain and death are not also routinely part of
that community’s social formation, especially with attention to the
sufferings of particular people in those communities.
In conclusion, it is all too easy to slip into a dominant mode of
technology-as-asocial, and from thence, to unhelpful and even harmful ways of thinking about people with disabilities. Solutions to the
dominant thoughts about dissociative technologies cannot come from
thinking about rules we might put in place for using our technologies,
as we and our technologies are far too diverse for such simplicity. Rather, as McCabe has suggested, Christians have a whole way of life, a
life that, if oriented and practiced (at least in part) toward our technologies and their use because of Jesus, we may have better hope of learning, ourselves, how to love.

